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SUPERCHARGER: IGNITING INTEREST IN 
CORPORATE TAX 
Edward J. Martineck* 
CORPORATE TAXATION AND TAXATION OF PARTNERS~S AND 
PARTNERS. By Douglas A. Kahn and Pamela B. Gann. St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co. 1979. Pp. lxxxi, 1107. $22.95. 
While I have heard subchapter C of the Internal Revenue 
Code1 compared to a Brahms concerto, and doubtless others view 
it as a Cretan Labyrinth harboring a monstrous Minotaur, for me 
it is a marvelous machine, an invention to rank with the internal-
combustion engine. Its operation is as complex and its guiding 
principles as ingenious; the modern American economy depends 
as heavily on the one for transportation as on the other for fi-
nance. While it would perhaps be more complimentary to portray 
Professors Douglas A. Kahn and Pamela B. Gann as a contempo-
rary Theseus and Ariadne threading a path to safety for the puz-
zled corporate tax student, instead I liken their book to a compact 
text of mechanical engineering, meant for those seriously inter-
ested in the law of corporate and partnership income taxation. It 
is an outstanding work, a major pedagogical achievement. The 
serious student will learn so much more of the nuts and bolts of 
corporate tax from this book than from any of its competitors as 
to put it in a class by itself. Its only weakness is probably an 
inevitable concomitant of its strength. The authors' fascination 
with the intricate detail of their subject sometimes risks the stu-
dent's losing sight of the basic interrelationships among the cor-
porate tax provisions. With this book, to belabor the metaphor, 
the student can easily so involve himself with the elaborate work-
ings of a camshaft that he forgets what it is connected to. 
Having delivered that encomium, let me warn the reader at 
once that I review this book from a unique standpoint. My own 
introduction to the corporate income tax was in a course taught 
by one of the authors at the University of Michigan Law School, 
using this book while it was still in mimeograph. If any excuse 
is possible for the presumptuousness of passing public judgment 
on one's own teacher, I plead my hope that the view from this 
side of the lectern will be of some help to those who daily stand 
on the other side. 
• Senior Editor, Michigan Law Review.-Ed. 
1. I.R.C. §§ 301-385. 
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Inherent in the case method of legal education is a post hoc 
approach to legally significant events. The student sees through 
the eyes of appellate judges deciding the legal consequences of 
events which typically occurred years before. For many subjects, 
torts and criminal law, for example, that approach is undeniably 
the appropriate one. The ethical lawyer is not engaged in plan-
ning torts or crimes. Even for such subjects as contracts and 
conveyancing, the practice of which obviously involves much 
planning of transactions, the case method is used profitably, it 
being relatively simple to plan "around" the substantive law. The 
contract draftsman will not have to worry about the Statute of 
Frauds so long as he knows enough to follow the simple formali-
ties it requires. Knowing the complicated exceptions to the Stat-
ute becomes important only after the fact, when for some reason 
the formalities have not been observed. The case method strains 
perceptibly, however, when used to teach a complex, interrelated 
statute such as the corporate tax provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. The mere knowledge that in a decided case or ruling 
facts A, B, and C gave result X under Code section Y only begins 
to -satisfy the corporate tax planner's needs. He must see the 
linkage of that Code section to others, must consider the effect 
of the result on other parties who may not have been before the 
court, and above all must discern how far those facts can be 
stretched before the result no longer holds. In other words, he 
must know not only what happens when the valves begin to stick 
a little, but how to design new ones for optimum performance. 
The most casual glance through this book shows how the 
authors have radically changed the case method to solve that 
pedagogical problem. In most casebooks, including the other 
leading corporate tax casebooks,2 the text of the cases is set in 
standard size type and any questions or notes following them are 
set in the same or smaller type. In this book, the authors' text and 
problems have been set in standard size type, with the cases and 
rulings set in smaller type! That is not a reflection of the authors' 
egos, simply the most obvious sign of their teaching philosophy, 
as stated in their preface: "We believe that corporate taxation is 
best presented by requiring the student to apply the apposite 
2. See, e.g., W. ANDREWS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND NOTES, 
738-1355 (1969); M. RosE & L. RAsKIND, ADVANCED FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CORPORATE 
TRANSACTIONS (1978); 2 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1973); B. WOLFMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BUSI• 
NESS ENTERPRISE (1971). 
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Code and judicial doctrines to a set of circumstances."3 In effect, 
they insist that the student see the machine in operation-that 
he poke around with it, try a different set of rings, vary the com-
pression ratio, try a different ignition system-all in myriad com-
binations and all to the end that he see every possibility for every 
part. The result is the most exciting and realistic way to learn 
corporate taxation I can imagine, but it puts extraordinary de-
mands on teacher and student alike. Whether the end justifies 
those demands is necessarily a question each teacher must answer 
himself. 
The book begins, conventionally enough, with a chapter on 
the economics and policy of the corporate income tax. The level 
of detail here is just as great as in the rest of the book. Not 
content, like many other casebook writers, to summarize the 
major arguments on the incidence of the corporate tax and on 
integration of the corporate and individual taxes, the authors 
excerpt substantial portions from the major works in this field of 
economics. One may well wonder how many law students will 
understand passages like this: 
Okner-~echman are essentially performing a two stage spe-
cific incidence study. They perform differential incidence analysis 
of the actual tax system vis-11-vis a proportional income tax system 
and then make a specific incidence assumption about a propor-
tional income tax and its associated effects. Since we know that 
public expenditures are not proportionally distributed, that wages 
may be affected by the cost of living, that taxes on capital income 
may be shifted, and that unemployment and inflation have very 
different effects on different income classes, their specific inci-
dence assumption is far from obvious and probably far from true.4 
While not all of the material is that dense, it is all much more 
sophisticated than corresponding material in other casebooks I 
have examined. 
The next chapter concerns the definition of a corporation and 
the problem of ignoring the corporate entity for income tax pur-
poses. This is probably the book's most easily understood chap-
ter, but the wealth of detail is again most impressive. A pertinent 
illustration is the authors' treatment of Larson v. Commissioner, 5 
a recent case heard by the entire Tax Court. The authors reprint 
3. D. KAHN & P. GANN, CORPORATE TAXATION AND TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND 
PARTNERS xvii (1979). 
4. Id. at 33 (quoting Thurow, The Economics of Public Finance, 28 NATL. TAX J. 185, 
188 (1975)). 
5. 66 T.C. 159 (1976), quoted in D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note"3, at 64-82. 
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several opinions from Larson, devoting to it eighteen pages of 
small print. While that might seem a profligate use of space on 
the narrow issue of whether a real estate limited partnership is 
taxable as a corporation, the treatment typifies a major strength 
of the book. The authors use Larson not only for its holding, and 
not only to show how a court can analyze a fact situation by 
considering a series of "factors," but also to raise some fundamen-
tal questions about legal process in the tax area: the use of prece-
dents, the use and limits of Treasury regulations, the need for 
certainty in tax law against the need to· prevent manipulation, 
and the differences between the Treasury's stance in its regula-
tions and the Service's nihil obstat in advance private letter rul-
ings. 6 Putting those difficult questions in the context of a real case 
6. See D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note 3, at 82-83. 
One unfortunate omission from the book, however, is any detailed discussion of the 
interesting questions of legal process posed by private letter rulings. Those questions nre 
much better addressed in a corporate tax course than in a basic individual income tax 
course. Given the importance of private rulings in corporate tax practice today, the stu-
dent should at least be exposed to the procedures and strategies surrounding them. The 
authors do discuss at various points the Service's published policies regarding the sub-
stance of transactions for which the protection of a private ruling is sought. See, e.g., id. 
at 724-25 (quoting Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568) (Service's guidelines for rulings on 
continuity of interest in reorganizations). They also cite some actual private rulings. See, 
e.g., id. at 385 (discussing Ltr. Rul. 7806078 (Nov. 14, 1977)). They do not even mention, 
however, any of the practical problems rulings create for the corporate tax planner. Should 
he seek a ruling? Is the reduction of risk worth the cost of delay? Is a given fact necessary 
to disclose for the ruling to stand up? Some introduction to questions like those would 
benefit any student planning to practice corporate tax law. 
One of the interesting aspects of private letter rulings goes to the essence of stare 
decisis and what we mean by the word "law." The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provides for 
the publication of all private letter rulings, the contents of which had previously been 
known only to the parties involved. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 
1201, 90 Stat. 1520, 1660 (adding I.R.C. § 6110). It does not take an especially keen 
imagination to see that the provision works a minor revolution in tax planning. Since the 
Service chums out about a hundred private rulings a week, the chances are good that the 
tax planner researching an issue can find a ruling directly on point, even if the Service 
has never publicly stated its position on the issue. Indeed, in many law firms it is now 
standard procedure to check the "private" rulings for every tax research problem. There 
is a catch, of course. The statute provides that "[u]nless the Secretary [of the Treasury! 
otherwise establishes by regulations, a written determination may not be used or cited as 
precedent." I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3). That is a caveat well worth pondering. One tax lawyer 
has jocularly suggested to me that it creates a strict rule of procedure: if a taxpayer cites 
any private ruling as precedent in a tax case, he automatically loses. Conversation with 
Kevin Conzelmann, Esq., in New York City (July 7, 1978). Of course, § 6110(j)(3) does 
not quite accomplish that, doubtless to the Service's regret, but what exactly does it 
accomplish? The famous National Starch ruling, which has already created a flurry of 
excitement among tax lawyers, is an interesting example. See Ltr. Ru!. 7839060 (June 28, 
1978), discussed in Hutton, Musings on Continuity of Interest-Recent Developments, 56 
TAXES 904, 910-11 (1978). It is a pity that Professors Kahn and Gann did not choose to 
include that ruling in their book. The ruling seems indeed to have "announce[dl the 
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makes them all the more thought-provoking. 
I hope I will not be thought churlish to record here a com-
plaint applicable to many casebooks. The authors end the second 
chapter with a standard casebook device: a hypothetical set of 
facts and a question, with a citation to a decided case giving the 
answer.7 Why do casebook writers so rarely give a sentence or two 
explaining what the court held? If the idea is that the student 
should have a chance to work out the answer for himself, that 
purpose would seem sufficiently served by summarizing the hold-
ing in a separate appendix to the text. In any event, the authors 
of this text add another twist to this annoying pedagogical device. 
After the question on the hypothetical and a citation to the case 
from which it was drawn, they ask, "Is this decision consistent 
with Harrison, 2-16?"8 Without being told the result in the case, 
the beleaguered student is asked to reconcile it with the result in 
another case. That is the sort of vexation which limits the supply 
of used lawbooks, as students currishly burn their casebooks at 
semester's end. 
After those two introductory chapters ( together about one-
tenth of the book) comes the heart of the volume: an extremely 
detailed study of subchapter C. The great practical significance 
of the separate corporate tax is immediately apparent to the stu-
dent because this part begins with the problem ofremoving assets 
from the corporation: in chapter 3 (dividends and redemptions), 
chapter 4 (liquidations), and chapter 5 (collapsible corporations). 
The study of subchapter C is then interrupted for some special 
corporate problems: first, the provisions aimed against the use of 
the corporate form to shelter income from the high individual tax 
rate (chapter 6, on the personal holding company tax and the 
emergence of ... a major new acquisition vehicle." Hutton, supra at 911. Since the 
transaction in question involved half a billion dollars, it is unlikely that the Service issued 
the ruling off-handedly. But can other tax planners rely on it, in the teeth of§ 6110(j)(3)? 
Can the Service really turn around and say that the next taxpayer with a similar transac-
tion is not entitled to the same treatment as the National Starch shareholders, now that 
the Service's rulings are spread out on the public record for all to see·? Those questions 
implicate the deep meaning of stare decisis, equal protection, and the nature of law; I 
would have been genuinely interested in what Professors Kahn and Gann had to say about 
them. Unhappily, they said nothing. · 
7. See D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note 3, at 110 (problem 2-24). 
B. Id. Perhaps the question is meant as a clever logical puzzle. The citation given is 
"See, R. W. Shaw, ID, 59 T.C. 375 (1972), acq., 1973-2 Cum.Bull. 3." Id. Perhaps the 
student is meant to infer that (1) the court's decision was for the taxpayer (because of 
the acquiescence); (2) the taxpayer was the individual described in the hypothetical and 
not his wholly owned corporation (because of the case name); and (3) therefore the court's 
holding was that the income in question was properly taxed to the corporation. 
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accumulated earnings tax); and, second, the provisions allowing 
corporate income to be passed through to shareholders (chapter 
7, on subchapter S corporations). Those two chapters might seem 
out of sequence, but they are both sufficiently self-contained to 
be put somewhere else in the curriculum without any drastic 
change. The book then returns to subchapter C to deal with cor-
porate formation, corporate divisions, and corporate reorganiza-
tions (chapters 8 through 10). A short chapter on the special 
problems of multiple corporations (consolidated returns, section 
482, and so on) concludes the study of corporate tax. Finally, a 
full one-sixth of the book is devoted to the taxation of partner-
ships and partners. 
Thus outlined, the organization of the book is not unusual, 
although the authors are probably in a minority among casebook 
writers in following the order of subchapter C rather than the life 
cycle of a corporation. Nor does a perusal of the table of cases 
provide many surprises. 9 Landmark cases like Gregory u. 
Helvering10 and Pinellas Ice Co. 11 are included as well as a few 
cases of only historical interest, such as Marr u. United States. 12 
The great bulk of the cases and rulings are of recent vintage, 
however, with a clear majority from the 1970s. Those include a 
large number that deal with issues still "hot."13 Although those 
9. One surprise it does provide is the most eccentric indexing system I have ever seen. 
Most books index tax cases under the last name of the taxpayer (where he is an individual) 
or the first word of the corporate name (where the taxpayer is a corporation). This book 
has apparently introduced the following complicated indexing system. (1) Individual tax-
payers: (a) Tax Court cases are indexed only under the individual's given name or initial. 
J. Simpson Dean is indexed under "J"; May B. Kass under "M." (b) Cases in other courts 
are indexed under the individual's last name. United States v. Davis is indexed under 
"D." (2) Corporate taxpayers: (a) With one exception described below, the cases are 
indexed under the first word of the corporate name. Charles Schneider & Co. is indexed 
under "C." (b) However, if the first word of the corporate name is an intitial, it is ignored. 
T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner is indexed under "H." While experimentation with novel 
indexing systems is arguably in everyone's best interests, this reader would have appre• 
ciated the publishers' including duplicate entries for the benefit of those accustomed to 
the conventional system. 
10. 293 U.S. 465 (1935), quoted in D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note 3, at 628-30. 
11. Pinellas Ice Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933), quoted in D. KAHN & P. 
GANN, supra note 3, at 711-13. 
12. 268 U.S. 536 (1924), quoted in D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note 3, at 699-702. 
13. The authors have amazingly been able to include a full coverage of the Revenue 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.), 
even though that complex statute was approved on November 6, 1978, and the book was 
available in bookstores in early January 1979. Because the authors' decisions on what 
cases to include were obviously made long before the Act was passed, there are some 
unavoidable anomalies. For example, the authors devote 20 pages to the Focht case. See 
D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note 3, at 575-96 (quoting and discussing Focht v. Commis• 
sioner, 68 T.C. 223 (1977) (reviewed by the court)). That is probably an excessive amount 
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features distinguish this work from some of its competitors, they 
do not make it unique. Must I then say of this book what a 
reviewer said of one of those competing works a few years ago, 
that "[c]asebooks on federal income tax unavoidably play sec-
ond fiddle to the Internal Revenue Code. They differ among 
themselves more in matters of style than of substance, covering 
the same ground with substantially the same emphases and lead-
ing cases."?14 Not at all. For this book at least, the style is the 
substance, because of the tremendous effect the unusual manner 
of presentation has on the student's learning experience. The 
dominant pedagogical idea of this book is that the student should 
work his own way through the Code and regulations, rather than 
being led through them. The book's tightly packed text thus con-
tains relatively little explanatory material. For example, consider 
how the book begins the treatment of complete liquidations. After 
referring the student to Code sections 331 through 336, the text 
begins: 
The tax consequences of a complete liquidatiqn depend on 
whether: 
(1) the corporation being liquidated is the subsidiary of 
another corporation; 
(2) a shareholder acquired a controlling interest in the 
liquidating corporation within a short time prior to the liqui-
dation; 
(3) certain statutory elections are available and have 
been made; 
(4) the liquidating corporation is "collapsible" (a term 
of art discussed in Chapter 5); and 
(5) the business of the liquidated corporation is reincor-
porated. 
Additionally, if a corporation sells all or part of its assets prepara-
tory to making distributions in liquidation, those sales may be 
subject to special tax treatment. 15 
of space now that the result has been codified, see Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
600, § 365, 92 Stat. 2763, 2854-55 (ac;Iding I.R.C. §§ 357(c)(3), 358(d)(2)), but the fact that 
the Focht court relied heavily on an article written by Professor Kahn may have played a 
role here. See Focht v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. at 239 (Simpson, J., concurring) (citing with 
approval Kahn & Oesterle, A Definition of "Liabilities" in Internal Revenue Code Sec-
tions ,157 and 358(d), 73 MICH. L. REv. 461 (1975)). 
In some instances, the timing of the book's appearance was quite serendipitous, 
because the student can virtually watch the Congress reacting to the courts. An example 
is the inclusion in the book of the Central Tablet case. See D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra 
note 3, at 376-86 (quoting and discussing Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 
U.S. 673 (1974)). As the book explains, see id. at 386, Congress reacted to the hardship 
put on certain taxpayers by that decision by amending § 337. See Act of Nov. 10, 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-628, § 4, 92 Stat. 3627, 3628 (adding 1.R.C. § 337(e)). 
14. Lowenthal, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1052, 1052 (1971) (review of W. 
ANDREWS, .~upra note 2). 
15. D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note 3, at 290. 
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That is an extraordinary amount of information to ingest in one 
bite. The digestion of that information is not aided by the absence 
of any discussion whatsoever of the function or general effect of 
the complete liquidation provisions. After the passage just 
quoted, the text gives in quick succession (1) eight sentences of 
terse rules on what constitutes a complete liquidation; (2) a cross-
reference noting that in general a corporation recognizes no gain 
or loss on its complete liquidation; and (3) six sentences on the 
general rule about the effect of the complete liquidation on share-
holders.16 
The treatment just summarized is typical of the entire book. 
I believe that that method genuinely risks overloading the stu-
dent with information. It is a commonplace that the attempt to 
transmit too much information in too short an interval results in 
the receipt of no information at all. 17 That risk would be greatly 
mitigated if the unifying 1deas behind the various Code provisions 
were more fully explained. Compare, f'or example, the way that 
Professors Bittker and Eustice begin their treatment of complete 
liquidations in their famous handbook. 18 They devote eight pages 
of text to the same basic summary (before _going on to analyze the 
rules in detail) to which Kahn and Gann devote a scant two 
pages. The basic information-the black-letter rules-are the 
same, but Bittker and Eustice allow themselves enough space to 
explain why the rules are thus and so. That makes a radical 
difference in the "digestibility" of the information. In one sense, 
of course, the comparison drawn here is invidious because of the 
different functions of the two works. I believe it is fair to compare 
them, however, because many students will find the Kahn and 
Gann book impenetrable without a vade mecum like the Bittker 
and Eustice work. I count myself among that number. After sev-
eral weeks of struggling through the Code and regulations with 
the little help that the Kahn and Gann book offers, I decided to 
stop trying to reinvent the wheel. From that point on, my method 
of study was to read the pertinent section of Bittker and Eustice 
before tackling the cases and problems in the Kahn and Gann 
book.19 The former's clear and full elucidation of the complexities 
16. Id. at 290-91. 
17. For example, read the sequence 2-9-0-5-9-3-1 to the average person and he will 
likely have no difficulty in repeating back the seven numerals. But read him 2-3-9-8-4-2-
1-8-2-3-6-l-O-l and he will probably not be able to repeat back even the first seven numer-
als. 
18. See B. BtTIKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS ,i,i 11.01 to 11.04, at 11-2 to 11-7, 11-13 to 11-15 (3d ed. 1971). 
19. Perhaps it is appropriate to mention that I have not felt a need to use this unusual 
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of subchapter C was in my experience an indispensable supple-
ment to the latter's schematic-diagram approach. 
I hope that no one will conclude from the fact that I needed 
Bittker and Eustice to understand the basics of corporate tax that 
the Kahn and Gann book was unimportant to my learning. Noth-
ing could be further from the truth. The challenges presented by 
the carefully crafted problems in this book were unforgettable; 
the vivid sense they conveyed of actually doing tax law was a 
major impetus to my decision to pursue a career in it. The nature 
of that experience is all but impossible to appreciate without 
working out some of the problems for oneself. It is nothing new, 
of course, to put problems in a tax casebook. Indeed, a reviewer 
noted of another casebook a few years ago: 
Professor Andrews' style is inquisitional. It exemplifies the view 
that students will be better educated if they try to answer ques-
tions than if they just read the answers. 
. . . From ABC transactions to zero basis, from fine points of 
law to broad issues of policy, Professor Andrews asks questions. 
The answers, when there are any, are rarely indicated.20 
Since that reviewer considered Professor Andrews' style 
"inquisitional," it is hard to imagine what adjective he would find 
to describe that of Professors Kahn and Gann. Take, for example, 
the problem of allocation of earnings and profits (e & p) in corpo-
rate distributions. The problems in Professor Andrews' casebook21 
are merely illustrations of everyday principles: distributions are 
out of current e & p to the extent thereof regardless of an accumu-
lated deficit; current e & p are allocated ratably to distributions 
made within the year; accumulated e & p are allocated to distri-
butions in order of time. All of the problems involve simple distri-
butions of money to shareholders who are individuals. In Profes-
sors Rose and Raskind's recent casebook, which also relies heavily 
on problems, there is a somewhat more sophisticated e & p prob-
lem. 22 The calculations of e & p in that problem are complicated 
by an "unreasonable" salary, a bribe paid to a state official, a 
distribution of inventory, and a distribution (in a different year) . 
of land which had increased in value in the corporation's hands. 
Nothing in Andrews' or Rose and Raskind's works even ap-
proaches the devilish ingenuity of the set of nine e & p problems 
method of study in any other course in three years of law school. 
20. Lowenthal, supra note 14, at 1052-53. 
21. W. ANDREWS, supra note 2, at 927-28, 935 (problems 58.10 to 58.12, 58.18, 58.19). 
22. M. RosE & L. R.AsKIND, supra note 2, at 117-18. 
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in the Kahn and Gann book. The first problem is an easy one of 
the Andrews type. The second is already of a sophistication simi-
lar to the Rose and Raskind problem: an accumulated deficit in 
e & p, some current e & p, but not enough to cover current 
distributions of cash and property to shareholders.23 When I 
worked that problem out in the course last year, I thought it was 
somewhat far-fetched. Relatively few corporations pay out divi-
dends while in a deficit situation and still fewer pay out dividends 
of money to some shareholders and property to others. My view 
of the wisdom of including the problem changed abruptly, how-
ever, when I was assigned precisely the same question during a 
summer clerkship with a Wall Street law firm; my faith in the 
authors changed a little, too, when careful study indicated an 
answer directly contrary to the one they suggest.24 Subsequent 
problems in the Kahn and Gann book are even more challenging. 
For example, problem 3-1225 involves distributions to an individ-
ual and to a corporation of appreciated property where the dis-
tributing corporation has no e & p. The student is asked to work 
out all the tax consequences: ordinary income (if any), reduction 
in basis, capital gain, effect one & p. Similarly, the next prob-
lem26 involves distributions to an individual and to a corporation 
of depreciated property with fair market values greater than ad-
justed bases but higher than original cost. Other problems in this 
group explore distributions of property subject to a liability27 and 
the effect on e & p of depreciation, the investment tax credit, and 
recapture. 28 
The problems summarized here are typical of those in the 
23. D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note 3, at 135-38 (problems 3-10 to 3-18), 
24. By citing Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-l(e) (1959) in the problem, id. at 136 (problem 3-
ll(a)), the authors apparently suggest that the current e & p are to be allocated first to 
money distributions and only then to property distributions. But that analogy fails. The 
allocation rule of the cited regulation fulfills a precise purpose under subchapter S, be-
cause only money distributed as dividends reduces the amount of income passed through 
to suhchapter S shareholders. See I.R.C. § 1373(c)(2). No analogous reason exists for 
allocating current e & p first to money distributions where the distributing corporation is 
an ordinary, non-subchapter S corporation. The logical and conceptually simple method 
is to allocate e & p according to the "amounts distributed" under g 301(b)(l); the 
scarce authority on the point seems in accord. See B. BrITKER & J. EUSTICE, .~upra note 
18, ~ 7.24, at 7-53 (alternative rule); M. CHIRELSTEIN, W. VAN DEMAN, A. SUWALSKV, & C. 
BALLEISEN, DIVIDENDS-CASH AND PROPERTY A-45 (BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolio #40-3rd, 
1971) (discussing private ruling obtained with respect to the divestiture by E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours and Co. of its General Motors stock). 
25. D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note 3, at 136-37. 
26. Id. at 137 (problem 3-13). 
27. See id. (problem 3-14). 
28. See id. at 138 (problem 3-17). 
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book. They are highly technical and admit of no easy answers._ 
They require the student to keep in mind the broad interrela- · 
tionships among the various Code sections while he focuses his 
attention on extremely narrow issues. Above all, they consume 
inordinate amounts· of time; I found that preparation for a class 
in this course generally took about triple the time for other 
courses. Even so, in a three-credit-hour course, we finished only 
slightly more than half of this book.29 To the excruciating de-
mands of this book there were correspon<iing rewards. This book 
gives the student an incomparable feel for the reality of tax prac-
tice. With it, teacher and student can explore an area of -interest · 
in almost limitless depth. Mastery of the problems, of course,· 
inculcates the technical expertise of corporate taxation. It has less 
obvious rewards as well. Working through one_ of the difficult 
questions is immensely satisfying psychologically. The close 
statutory interpretation the problems demand improves the 
student's reasoning ability while the practical nature of many 
of them give him a taste of business planning. 
In sum, this is not a book for everyone. Not every teacher will 
want to use it; not every student will be able. Those who try and 
succeed will find their work well worthwhile. 
29. We did chapters 3, 4, 5, half of 6, 7, 8, and 9. That meant omitting the material 
dealing with the definition of a corporation, the accumulated earnings tax. corporate 
reorganizations (!), multiple corporations, and partnerships. Obviously, we made up in 
depth what we lost in breadth of coverage, but the teacher using this hook for the first 
time will have to take extraordinary care to create a realistic schedule. 
